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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,

)

Plaintiff and Respondent,
(
I

vs.

)

(

]. BERT NELSON and MYRTLE G.
NELSON, et al.,

Case No.
9256

\
}

Defendants and Appellants. ,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises out of the enlargement of the Pineview
Reservoir by respondent and the taking necessitated thereby
of 10.3 acres of land from the appellants' farm. For some 25
years prior to the enlargement of the reservoir, appellants had
operated a dairy farm located near Huntsville, Utah. Their
farm consisted of 79 acres of land which appellants own and,
as indicated by the conflicting evidence of the various wit3
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nesses, between 2 and 7 acres of usable reservoir lands the
use of which appellants obtained by a now expired 20-year
lease of some 70 acres of land occupied by the original Pineview
Reservoir (R. 104, 110, 170). All of these 70 acres of reservoir
lands were inundated by water except the buffer areas lying
above the high water mark and below the condemned area
(R. 168) . In addition, the appellants pastured their dry stock
on a lease basis on lands owned by a neighbor (R. 41, 48).
Eight acres of the area condemned and the usable reservoir
lands served as the pasture for appellants' dairy cows on the
date in question. The remainder of the farm was level, irrigated
land suitable for growing a variety of crops, including the
principal crops of hay and grain needed to sustain the dairy
livestock. This crop land area lay to the east of the condemned
area on a rather level ((bench" some 20 feet higher in elevation
than the existing reservoir water level.
Located at the east end of the farm were various farm
buildings, including a house, hay barn, milking parlor, livestock shed, potato cellar and machine shed. These buildings
were arranged, used as, and met the requirements of a Grade
UA" dairy operation, producing market milk for human consumption (R. 20-21).
The 10.3 acres of land acquired by the respondent is
situated on the western end of the farm and includes all of
the natural pasture on appellants' farm. It also has located
on it a spring \vhich is the only live source of \Vater on appellants' property for the dairy animals, except the culinary water
supplied to the residence and farm buildings. The culinary
water supply, during the winter months, sometimes proved to
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be unreliable and inadequate for the usage demanded by
appellants' herd of dairy animals (R. 31).
In the acquisition of the 10.3 acres of land, respondent
takes the spring and deprives appellants of any access to it
(R. 29), thereby leaving appellants, as they view it, without
a suitable place to water their livestock (R. 31). ·Prior to the
enlargement of the reservoir, appellants maintained a dairy
herd of approximately 25 milking cows and 20 dry stock (R.
21-22). With their pasture lands and spring taken away, it
became impossible to carry on a dairy operation. It is conceded
by both parties that the farm, as it now is, is not suitable for
a dairy operation, and that the buildings peculiar! y suited
to the dairy opertaion have lost much, or all, of their value
(R. 33, 34, 36, 62-66, 136-138). Respondent attributes this
more to the loss of the leased lands than the loss of the land
acquired by it (R. 138). However, appellants testified that
if the 10.3 acres and the spring had not been taken from them,
they would have been able to continue a 2 5-cow dairy operation
on the land they owned by feeding additional supplemental
feeds or by converting 5 acres of land to planted pasture and
reducing the number of dry stock ( R. 61, 114-115) .
Upon motion of the respondent, the issue of the value of
appellants' 10.3 acres of land and the damage to appellants'
remaining property was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories as follows (R. 205) :
uwe the jury impanelled in the above entitled cause
make awards as follows:
1. Just con1pensation for property taken:

A. Value of the 10.3 acres taken, to-
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gether with spring water on lands
taken -----------------------------------···-···---------· $3,0 50.00
2. Just compensation for severance damage
to property not taken -------------------------- 1,847.00
Total just compensation awarded________ 4,897 .00"

The interrogatories appear to be signed and read as
follows:
'' 1. What was the reasonable fair market

value of the defendants' total property
as of March 24, 1957 (the day before
the taking of the 10.3 acres, assuming
a purchaser and seller both did not
know it was to be taken?)
Answer --------------------------------------------$51,600. 00''
There are eight signatures. All jurors signed.
'' 2. What was the reasonable fair market
value of the defendants' total property
as of March 26, 1959 (the day after the
taking of the 10.3 acres, assuming a
purchaser and seller both knew the
said property was taken?)
Answer ------------------------------------------------$46,20 3.00''

There are seven signatures.
"3. What v:as the highest and best reasonable use of the property in question as
a purchaser and seller would consider
it before the taking of the said 10.3
acres? (Please v1rite brief description.)
The description written: "Crop farm
with a very limited number of livestock."
Signed by all eight jurors.
1{4. What was the highest and best reason-
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able use of the property in question as a
purchaser and seller would consider it
after the taking of the said 10.3 acres?
(Please write brief description.)
The brief description written: nCrop farm."
Appellants, by timely motions, attempted to obtain a new
trial, or in the alternative, a modification of the verdict to
correspond with the evidence.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER AND
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH TI-IE GENERAL VERDICT.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING RESPONDENT'S WITNESS WARNICK TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT
CONCERNING ANIMAL CARRYING CAPACITY OF APPELLANTS' LANDS.
III. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY AND PREJUDICIALLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO DAMAGES TO
APPELLANTS' (<DAIRY BUSINESS."
ARGUMENT

I.
THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER AND
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL VERDICT.
This matter is governed by the provisions of Rule 49 (b),
7
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, wherein it is stated as follows:

(((b) General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to
Interrogatories . ... When the answers are consistent
with each other but one or more is inconsistent with
the general verdict, the court may direct the entry of
judgment in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict or may return the jury for
further consideration of its answers and verdict or may
order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent
with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not
direct the entry of judgment but may return the jury
for further consideration of its answers and verdict
or may order a new trial."

It is the position of appellants that the answers to the
interrogatories are inconsistent with each other and that one
or more of them are also inconsistent with the general verdict,
and that a new trial should be granted. However, it is possible
to reconcile the inconsistent answers in such a manner as to
provide a verdict which could be justified under the evidence,
as will be explained later.
The verdict of the jury on June 12, 1958, awarded appellants damages as follows:
10.3 acres condemned --------------------------------------$3,050.00
Severance damages --------------------------------------------$1,847.00
Total --------------------------------------------------------$4,897.00
In the answers to the interrogatories the jury stated that
the fair market value of the farm before condemnation was
$51,600.00, and the fair market value after the taking was
$46,203.10. The difference of $5,396.90, whereas the jury'~
8
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total award was $4,897.00, clearly constitutes an inconsistencj
of the type contemplated by Rule 49 (b), and shows that the
jury made no attempt to follow the measure of damages rule
set out by the court in Instruction No. 9 (R. 194):
tc

1. You shall determine in dollars the fair market

value of the entire farm of the defendants, including the improvements, as of March 25, 1957.
2. You shall then determine the fair market value as
of the same date of the farm of the defendants,
including the improvements, after the taking of the
said 10.3 acres of land.
3. The difference represents the total just compensation to be awarded to the defendants.
From the foregoing difference you shall then deduct
the fair market value of the 10.3 acres of land taken.
The remainder, if any, is the amount of severance
damages to be awarded."
An analysis of the answers also will point out that they are
clearly inconsistent with each other. The answer to special
interrogatory number 1 stating that the fair market value of the
property was $51,600.00 before the taking is the exact figure
given by Mr. Werner Kiepe in his testimony (R. 135). The
jury could not have possibly arrived at that figure by any other
means. The answer to special interrogatory number 2 of
$46,203.10 as being the fair market value of the property
after the taking is the precise figure given by Mr. Story as
his value of the properties after the taking (R. 55). The jury
could not have arrived at that precise figure by any means other
than accepting Mr. Story's figure, particularly since Mr. Kiepe's
«(after" value was $48,050.0Q-a higher amount (R.136) .
An analysis of the two foregoing figures, together with
9
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the testimony of Mr. Kiepe and Mr. Story, points out the serious
inconsistency in accepting those two figures. The discrepancy
appears in the values placed upon the properties, both before
and after the taking, by the two appraisers. For instance:

Value of Farm Buildings Per Kiepe:
Lounging shed
(Before and After Value) ----------------------$2,000.00
Hay barn, milk barn and milk house
(Before and After Value) ----------------------$1,100.00
TotaL------------·----------------------------------$ 3, 100.00

V altte of Farm Buildings Per Story After Taking:
Lounging shed --------------------------------------------$1,152.00
Milk house ---------------------------------------------------Milk barn -----------------------________ --------------------Hay barn ------------------------------------------------------$2,960.10
T otaL _______________________________________________ $4, 112.10
It is quite obvious from the foregoing that the amounts
arrived at by the jury as their answers to special interrogatories
1 and 2 show appellants' farm buildings as having more value
after the taking than before. The figure given by Mr. Story as
the after value of the farm exceeds Mr. Kiepe' s value after
and before the condemnation by $1,012.10. This inconsistency
would penalize the Nelsons unnecessarily and points out the
folly of the jury's answer.
In addition to the foregoing inconsistency, the testimony
of Mr. Story was that the entire group of farm buildings, including the residence and the buildings not listed above, had an
after value of $18,603.10. Mr. Kiepe placed a before and after
value of $16,000.00 on those buildings, making an additional
variance of $1,591.00 (R. 62-66, 136).
10
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The only possible consistent approach which could be made in
the form of entering a verdict in this case would be as follows:
Base difference between $51,600.00, less
$46,20 3.10 ---------------------------------------------------- $5' 396.90
Inconsistency in answers between after
values of Story and Kiepe relative to buildings used for milking purposes ------------------

$1,012.10

Inconsistency on remaining farm buildings
and residence per analysis of before and
after figures of Story and Kiepe__________________ $1,591.00
TotaL ______ ------------------------------------_________ $8, 000.00
It would be a travesty on justice to permit the figure of
$51,600.00 as the before value of the property set out by Mr.
Kiepe to stand against the after value of $46,203.10 given by
Mr. Story when in fact the after value given by Mr. Story con-

tains appraisal figures on certain farm buildings which considerably exceed the before or after value placed upon them
by Mr. Kiepe!
There do not seem to be any cases under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure or the corresponding Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that would be of much assistance to the court, particularly since matters of this type must necessarily depend
upon the peculiar factual situation of each case.
In 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec. 1082, it is stated:
n

•

•

•

if findings are made which are contradictory

as to material facts, such facts are left undetermined,
and since it is not the province of the court, unless by
consent, to determine them, no judgment can be ren·

dered."
11
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In 39 Am. Jur., New Trial, Sec. 139, it is further stated:
Likewise, where findings which constitute
the foundation of a general verdict appear to be un·
justified, a new trial will be ordered."
cc

•

•

•

Support for the foregoing statement is also found in a
case note found at 56 A.L.R. 2d 1251:

\CA new trial should be ordered where the general
verdict is in plaintiffs favor, and the special findings
of the jury, which are supported by the evidence, are
inconsistent with one another, or consistent with one
another but inconsistent with the general finding,
though not destructive of the plaintiff's right of recovery.''

Under the evidence the special interrogatories are clearly
inconsistent with each other, and the same are inconsistent
with the general verdict rendered in the matter. Accordingly:
although the special interrogatories can be reconciled for an
$8,000.00 verdict by stretching their construction, appellants
submit that the only real course which the lower court had
available was to grant a new trial.
II.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING RESPONDENT'S WITNESS WARNICK TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT
CONCERNING ANIMAL CARRYING CAPACITY OF APPELLANTS' LANDS.
In attempting to qualify Francis M. Warnick as an
expert witness to testify as to the carrying capacity of the 10.3

12
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acres of land taken from appellants, the respondent was able
to show only that Mr. \Varnick was raised as a boy on a farm
in Millard County, Utah; that it was an all-purpose farm having
some livestock and devoted principally to the raising of alfalfa
and grains; that the farm did not have any pasture land on
it; and that since becoming a civil engineer, and particularly
since 1942, Mr. Warnick had done work in planning irrigation
developments and analyzing the economic effect of such developments upon farm lands (R. 165-166).
On cross-examination, Mr. Warnick admitted that, in fact,
he had never made an investigation of appellants' 10.3 acres
to determine its productivity or carrying capacity. This is amply
clear from the following testimony:

tcQ. What were you doing when you went into that red
area to examine it?
A. The specific times that I have gone in there I have
either been supervising survey groups who have
been taking topogs of the area or visiting the areas
specifically to identify general vegetative cover or
to identify erosion problems.

Q. In other words you have never really gone into that
area to make a study as such of the carrying capacity of livestock on it, have you?
A. No, I only know this from having identified the
vegetative cover throughout the reservoir area and
having some experience with valuation of carrying
capacity of various kinds of pasture.

Q. Am I correct in this that the analysis you made
of the carrying capacity was really a by-product
or a side-line to the real purpose you were there ?
A. That's correct." (R. 174-175).
13
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In spite of this obvious lack of knowledge and experience
concerning the pasturing of livestock, the witness was permitted to testify that in the 7 or 8 acres of the usable land
obtained by appellants under the reservoir lease, the appellants
could pasture 12 animals (R. 173) but that in approximately
8.3 acres of the land ta-ken from the appellants they could only
pasture 2 or 3 animals (R. 172) ! The witness knew nothing
about appellants' practice with respect to the pasturing of their
animals and he did not even know how many animals they
had been maintaining on their farm (R. 173-174).
Certainly, the testimony on this subject comes within the
requirement that the witness answering the questions have
specialized knowledge or experience to qualify him as an expert
and permit his opinion to be received by the jury. The rule
suggested in Section 559 of 2 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, is thatUNo special experience shall be required unless the
matter to be testified to is one upon which it would
clearly be presumptuous, under the circumstances of
the case, for a person of only ordinary experience to
assume to trust his senses, for the purpose of his own
action in the ordinary serious affairs of life."
This rule, if applied to the subject matter of the testimony
offered in this case, would clearly indicate that this is a subject
upon which the ordinary individual would seek the advice
of an experienced person if he were making a decision which
depended upon the accurate determination of such a fact.
It is stated in 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 783, thatUTa be competent to testify as an expert witness, one
must have acquired such special knowledge of the

14
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subject matter about which he is to testify, either by
study of the recognized authorities or by practical experience, that he can give the jury assistance and guidance in solving a problem which the jury are not able
to solve because their knowledge is inadequate."
The possession of the required qualifications by a particular
witness must be expressly shown by the party offering the
witness ( 2 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 560). Also,
((When a witness is offered as an expert upon a
matter in issue, his competency, with respect to special
skill or experience, is to be determined by the court as

a question preliminary to the admission of his testimony.
There should be a finding by the court, in the absence
of an admission or a waiver by the adverse party, that
the witness is qualified; and since there is no presumption that a witness is competent to give an opinion, it
is incumbent upon the party offering the witness to
show that the latter possesses the necessary learning,
know ledge, skill, or practical experience to enable him
to give opinion testimony." (20 Am. Jur., Evidence,
Sec. 786). (Italics added).
Although the respondent failed to show that this particular
witness was qualified either by study or by any recent experience
or that he had even made an inspection of the property in
question for the purpose of determining its carrying capacity,
the court, when it ruled on appellants' objection to the witness's qualifications, in effect ignored its responsibility to
either find the witness qualified or to exclude his testimony.
This is amply shown by the testimony beginning at the bottom
of Page 169 of the Record:

tcQ. Now, based on your experience both as a civil
engineer and on the farm, I' 11 ask you whether you
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have an opinion as to the carrying capacity of the
area in green ?
A. I do.

Q. And what is your opinion?
MR. FULLER: Now, we raise an objection at this
point. There is no proper foundation shown for this
witness to show the carrying capacity of livestock
on this area.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The jury
may give his opinion such weight as you think it
is entitled."
Appellants submit that it is not for the jury to determine
the degree to which a witness is qualified or unqualified to
give an expert opinion. It is first for the court to rule on the
qualifications and then, if the expert is qualified, the jury
may consider his opinion, the reasons given for it and weigh
such opinion with the other evidence in the case. The court
in this case in effect told the jury:
''You judge the witness. If you think he is qualified
as an expert you may accept his testimony; if you think
he is not qualified as an expert you may disregard his
testimony.''
This results in extre1ne prejudice to the appellants for two
reasons:
1. It implies to the jury that the witness is qualified

and that they shall give weight to his testimony.
2. One of the crucial issues in this case was whether

or not the appellants' farm could be operated as a
dairy farm with the 10.3 acres of land condemned,
but \vithout the lease of the original reservoir lands.

16
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The jury's answer to special interrogatory number 3 to
the effect that the highest and best use of the farm before
the taking was ·'crop farm with very limited number of livestock" leaves no doubt but that the testimony of Mr. Warnick
on the subject of the carrying capacity of the 10.3 acres of
land was accepted by the jury. It should further be noted that
respondent requested the special interrogatories to be given
the jury and that Warnick's testimony was undoubtedly planned
in advance to support the answer to interrogatory number 3
which respondent hoped to elicit from the jury. This was the
only cases in the series tried wherein special interrogatories
of this type were submitted to the jury.

III.

THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY AND PREJUDICIALLY INSTRUCTED 1'HE JURY AS TO DAMAGES TO
APPELLANTS' ctDAIRY BUSINESS."
The court instructed the jury (R. 195):

"No. 12.
You are instructed that for the purpose of determining
the amount of just compensation to be awarded to the
defendants, there is a distinction between damage to
lands and improvements not taken, vlhich result from
the taking of a part of the defendants' property, and
damage to the ~~dairy business'' heretofore conducted
by the defendants on their lands. Damage to the lands
and improvements not taken constitutes severance
damage for which compensation may be awarded, but
no compensation can be awarded for damage to or
17
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destruction of a ndairy business" regardless of who
conducted it on the land. Severance damages are
awarded only for loss of temarket value" which could
be expected in a sale. Therefore loss in ((market value"
is to be compensated for and may be reflected in part
in the adaptability of the land and improvements for
profitable use, but other losses to a profitable business
is not compensatable."
The appellants excepted to the giving of instruction number 12, as follows (R. 203) :
nException is taken to instruction number 12 and to
the whole thereof for the reason that there is no evidence in this case submitted by the defendants or by
the plaintiffs relating to the value of the properties as
a ((dairy business," as the term is intended to mean in
the instruction, that in no case has there been any evidence offered relating to profits of the business or even
to the productivity of the dairy business and that the
giving of the instruction tends to mislead the jury
relative to any severance damages that might be awarded for the .remaining buildings on the property of the
defendants."
Respondent also objected to the instruction (R. 202),
thereby providing unanimous concurrence as to its impropriety:
((Plaintiff excepts to instruction number 12 and particularly to the last two sentences thereof which refer
to market value but fail to specify market value. Because of its failure to specify the property that market
value refers to, the instruction is confusing and prejudical to the plaintiff."
Viewed in the light of the evidence presented to the jury,
the instruction draws an unwarranted, unnecessary and improper distinction between the dan1age which results to appel18
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lants' rematntng lands and improvements as a result of the
taking of the 10.3 acres and damage to ((dairy business." It is,
of course, true that a property owner is not entitled to be
compensated in a case of this sort for any loss of future profiits
or reduction in future business. It is the contention of appellants, however, that by wording the instruction as it did, the
court conveyed to the jury an impression that they were not
to award appellants any sum of money to compensate fo;
the reduction in value of the farm buildings that were used
in the dairy operation.
Throughout the instructions given to the jury, the court
repeatedly indicated that damages could be awarded for a
reduction in value to ' (remaining lands and improvements.''
Then, in instruction number 12, the court removes from the
consideration of the jury and from the broad definition of
((lands and improvements'; what it chose to call ((the dairy
business." Since there was absolutely no testimony introduced
or claim made on the part of either appellants or respondents
concerning any alleged value or depreciation in value of appellants' ((business," loss of future profits or any claim for compensation to cover such items, a reasonable jury could logically
conclude that the phrase ((dairy business" referred to the dairy
buildings. There was no evidence to indicate that it could mean
anything else, and in attempting to follow the court's distinction
between "lands and improvements not taken" and ((dairy business" the jury, based on the evidence introduced at the trial,
\vould have to conclude that the dairy buildings as a group
constituted an item which could not be included in their award
of damages.

19
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The rule applicable to this situation is set out in 3 Am.
Jur., Appeal and Error, Sec. 1124:
((The test of reversible error is whether or not the
jury was misled so that they reached a different result
than they would have reached but for the error, or
whether there is a serious misdirection in the charge
excluding from the consideration of the jury an issue
properly in the case, or whether the instruction probably prejudically affected the substantial rights of the
complaining party.... Instructions which tend to mislead the jury or which could have any influence thereon
are ordinarily grounds for reversal." (Italics added.)
In view of the fact that there was no evidence concerning
the value of a ((dairy business' or of a claim for loss of profits
or any other item related thereto, the attempt of the court to
inject a distinction between ((dairy business" and the damage
to the remaining lands and improvements was totally uncalled
for and certainly misled the jury to such a degree that they
reached a result contrary to the result which would have been
reached had the instruction not been given. The inadequacy
of the severance award contained in the verdict clearly suggests
that the jury did not consider the damages to appellants' dairy
buildings.
By their answer to special interrogatory number 4, the
jury indicated that the remaining properties could be used only
as a crop farm. Implied in this answer is the conclusion that
the dairy buildings were severely reduced in value. In light
of this, the inadequate severance award supports the appellants'
contention that the jury was misled by instruction number 12
and that one of the rna jor issues of this case was thereby re-
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moved from the jury's consideration, resulting in substantial
prejudice to the appellants and justifying a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Appellants submit that the verdict and judgment entered

in this matter should be reversed and set aside and a new trial
ordered.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER
SCOTT D. ALLEN

Attorneys for Appellanti~ ....
15 East Fourth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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